%0 Report
        %A Dreher, Axel
%A Klasen, Stephan
%A Vreeland, James Raymond
%A Werker, Eric
        %T The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
        %D 2010
        %8 2010 Mar
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4820
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4820
        %X As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.
        %K United Nations Security Council
%K political influence
%K aid effectiveness
%K World Bank