@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4782,
            	author={Dur, Robert and Non, Arjan and Roelfsema, Hein},
            	title={Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace},
            	year={2010},
	month={Feb},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4782},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4782},
	abstract={We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to
receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.
},
	keywords={double moral hazard;GSOEP;social exchange;reciprocity;incentive contracts},
            }