TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Sutter, Matthias
AU  - Czermak, Simon
AU  - Feri, Francesco
        TI  - Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
        PY  - 2010/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4732
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4732
        AB  - We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
        KW  - individual decision making
KW  - team decision making
KW  - experiment
KW  - beliefs
KW  - strategic sophistication
        ER  -