%0 Report
        %A Sutter, Matthias
%A Czermak, Simon
%A Feri, Francesco
        %T Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
        %D 2010
        %8 2010 Jan
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4732
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4732
        %X We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
        %K individual decision making
%K team decision making
%K experiment
%K beliefs
%K strategic sophistication