@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4732,
            	author={Sutter, Matthias and Czermak, Simon and Feri, Francesco},
            	title={Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games},
            	year={2010},
	month={Jan},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4732},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4732},
	abstract={We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.},
	keywords={individual decision making;team decision making;experiment;beliefs;strategic sophistication},
            }