TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Chiappori, Pierre-André
AU  - Donni, Olivier
        TI  - Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature
        PY  - 2009/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4603
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4603
        AB  - This article considers non-unitary models of household behavior. These models suppose explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient; and non-cooperative (or strategic) models which are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be identified from observable behavior.
        KW  - testability
KW  - strategic model
KW  - collective model
KW  - households
KW  - identification
        ER  -