%0 Report
        %A Chiappori, Pierre-André
%A Donni, Olivier
        %T Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature
        %D 2009
        %8 2009 Nov
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4603
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4603
        %X This article considers non-unitary models of household behavior. These models suppose explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient; and non-cooperative (or strategic) models which are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be identified from observable behavior.
        %K testability
%K strategic model
%K collective model
%K households
%K identification