TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Kahana, Nava
AU  - Mealem, Yosef
AU  - Nitzan, Shmuel
        TI  - The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information
        PY  - 2009/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4181
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4181
        AB  - This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.
        KW  - single beneficiary
KW  - indivisible project
KW  - efficient and fair implementation
KW  - multiple-cost bearers
KW  - unilateral information
        ER  -