@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4181,
            	author={Kahana, Nava and Mealem, Yosef and Nitzan, Shmuel},
            	title={The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information},
            	year={2009},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4181},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4181},
	abstract={This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.},
	keywords={single beneficiary;indivisible project;efficient and fair implementation;multiple-cost bearers;unilateral information},
            }