TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Reuben, Ernesto
AU  - Suetens, Sigrid
        TI  - Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation
        PY  - 2009/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4107
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4107
        AB  - We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.
        KW  - strong reciprocity
KW  - strategic cooperation
KW  - conditional cooperation
KW  - reputation building
        ER  -