%0 Report
        %A Reuben, Ernesto
%A Suetens, Sigrid
        %T Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation
        %D 2009
        %8 2009 Apr
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4107
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4107
        %X We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.
        %K strong reciprocity
%K strategic cooperation
%K conditional cooperation
%K reputation building