@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4107,
            	author={Reuben, Ernesto and Suetens, Sigrid},
            	title={Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation},
            	year={2009},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4107},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4107},
	abstract={We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.},
	keywords={strong reciprocity;strategic cooperation;conditional cooperation;reputation building},
            }