@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4049,
            	author={Koch, Alexander K. and Nafziger, Julia},
            	title={Commitment to Self-Rewards},
            	year={2009},
	month={Feb},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4049},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp4049},
	abstract={Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplish¬ments and are widely recommended as tools for overcoming self-control problems. However, it seems puzzling why self-rewards can work: the prospect of a reward has a motivating force only if the threat of self-denial of the reward after low performance is credible. We explain how a rational forward-looking individual may achieve commitment to self-rewards, by applying Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of endogenous reference point formation to a self-regulation problem. Our results show why and when self-regulation built on self-rewards can be successful and thus illustrate the power, but also the limits, of self-rewards.},
	keywords={time inconsistency;self-reinforcement;reference-dependent preferences;self-control;motivation},
            }