TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bellemare, Charles
AU  - Lepage, Patrick
AU  - Shearer, Bruce S.
        TI  - Peer Pressure, Incentives, and Gender: An Experimental Analysis of Motivation in the Workplace
        PY  - 2009/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3948
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3948
        AB  - We present results from a real-effort experiment, simulating actual work-place conditions, comparing the productivity of workers under fixed wages and piece rates. Workers, who were paid to enter data, were exposed to different degrees of peer pressure under both payment systems. The peer pressure was generated in the form of private information about the productivity of their peers. We have two main results. First, we find no level of peer pressure for which the productivity of either male or female workers is significantly higher than productivity without peer pressure. Second, we find that very low and very high levels of peer pressure can significantly decrease productivity (particularly for men paid fixed wages). These results are consistent with models of conformism and self-motivation.
        KW  - piece rates
KW  - fixed wages
KW  - peer effects
KW  - gender
        ER  -