TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Abeler, Johannes
AU  - Falk, Armin
AU  - Götte, Lorenz
AU  - Huffman, David B.
        TI  - Reference Points and Effort Provision
        PY  - 2009/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3939
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3939
        AB  - A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.
        KW  - reference points
KW  - expectations
KW  - loss aversion
KW  - risk aversion
KW  - disappointment
KW  - experiment
        ER  -