TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Gächter, Simon
AU  - Nosenzo, Daniele
AU  - Renner, Elke
AU  - Sefton, Martin
        TI  - Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example
        PY  - 2008/Dec/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3914
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3914
        AB  - We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations.
        KW  - contribution preferences
KW  - leading-by-example
KW  - false consensus effect
KW  - reciprocity
KW  - leadership
        ER  -