TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Courty, Pascal
AU  - Marschke, Gerald
        TI  - On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations
        PY  - 2008/Dec/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3862
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3862
        AB  - We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium assortative matching takes place; more able physicians join occupations less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk above a given threshold are not viable. The model offers an explanation for the persistence of distortions in the mix of health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in medical specialization.
        KW  - performance measurement
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - incentives
KW  - matching
KW  - pre-matching investment
KW  - career choice
KW  - medical specialization
        ER  -