TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bolhaar, Jonneke
AU  - Lindeboom, Maarten
AU  - Klaauw, Bas van der
        TI  - A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
        PY  - 2008/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3698
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3698
        AB  - We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.
        KW  - panel data
KW  - supplementary private health insurance
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - health care utilization
KW  - advantageous selection
        ER  -