TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Kaas, Leo
        TI  - Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment
        PY  - 2008/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3697
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3697
        AB  - This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical.
        KW  - matching function
KW  - coordination frictions
KW  - unemployment
        ER  -