@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp3697,
            	author={Kaas, Leo},
            	title={Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment},
            	year={2008},
	month={Sep},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={3697},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3697},
	abstract={This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical.},
	keywords={matching function;coordination frictions;unemployment},
            }