TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Eriksson, Tor
AU  - Poulsen, Anders
AU  - Villeval, Marie Claire
        TI  - Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence
        PY  - 2008/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3440
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3440
        AB  - This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer effects since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and frontrunners do not slack off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers’ work.
        KW  - evaluation
KW  - feedback
KW  - information
KW  - peer effects
KW  - piece rate
KW  - tournament
KW  - performance pay
KW  - experiment
        ER  -