@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp342,
            	author={Schnedler, Wendelin},
            	title={The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models},
            	year={2001},
	month={Aug},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={342},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp342},
	abstract={A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.},
	keywords={stochastic order relation;statistical discrimination;Adverse selection},
            }