@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp3117,
            	author={Roider, Andreas},
            	title={Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope},
            	year={2007},
	month={Oct},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={3117},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3117},
	abstract={This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project’s scope before some later decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that only if exogenous risk is sufficiently large, the risk-neutral principal may prefer to delegate authority over decisions to the risk-averse agent. Intuitively, for incentive reasons, the principal may optimally want to allow the agent to reduce his risk exposure. Nevertheless, even endogenous risk may be higher when the risk-averse agent has control.},
	keywords={authority;delegation;partial contracting;risk},
            }