TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Gürtler, Oliver
AU  - Harbring, Christine
        TI  - Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence
        PY  - 2007/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3111
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp3111
        AB  - In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information regarding the agents’ previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credibly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.
        KW  - feedback
KW  - commitment problems
KW  - tournament
KW  - experiment
        ER  -