%0 Report
        %A Koch, Alexander K.
%A Peyrache, Eloic
        %T Moral Hazard Contracts: Does One Size Fit All?
        %D 2006
        %8 2006 Nov
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 2463
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2463
        %X Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents’ productivities. Firms’ practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a “one-size-fits-all” approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.
        %K career concerns
%K incentive contracts
%K reputation
%K anonymous contracts