TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Irlenbusch, Bernd
AU  - Ruchala, Gabriele K.
        TI  - Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation
        PY  - 2006/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 2423
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2423
        AB  - How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest contributors in teams. A purely team-based compensation scheme induces agents to voluntarily cooperate while introducing an additional relative reward increases effort and efficiency only when the bonus is substantial. In this case, however, the data suggests that tournament competition crowds out voluntary cooperation within a team.
        KW  - relative rewards
KW  - motivation crowding out
KW  - voluntary cooperation
KW  - bonus pools
KW  - personnel economics
KW  - teamwork
KW  - experiments
        ER  -