TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Habermalz, Steffen
        TI  - The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited
        PY  - 2006/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 2309
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2309
        AB  - This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence’s original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.
        KW  - employer learning
KW  - signaling
        ER  -