%0 Report
        %A Habermalz, Steffen
        %T The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited
        %D 2006
        %8 2006 Sep
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 2309
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2309
        %X This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence’s original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.
        %K employer learning
%K signaling