@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp2309,
            	author={Habermalz, Steffen},
            	title={The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited},
            	year={2006},
	month={Sep},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={2309},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2309},
	abstract={This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence’s original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.},
	keywords={employer learning;signaling},
            }