@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp2232,
            	author={Goerke, Laszlo},
            	title={Earnings-Related Severance Pay},
            	year={2006},
	month={Jul},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={2232},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2232},
	abstract={In an efficiency wage economy, lump-sum severance pay from which shirkers can be excluded raises employment. However, severance payments are usually related to wages. It is shown that earnings-related, mandated severance pay will have ambiguous employment effects if effort can be varied continuously. A substitution of the earnings-related for the lump-sum component reduces employment. Thus, the prevalent form of severance payments in OECD countries might have less advantageous employment effects than previously conjectured.},
	keywords={earnings relationship;efficiency wages;employment;severance pay},
            }