TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
AU  - Bowles, Samuel
AU  - Gintis, Herbert
        TI  - Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity
        PY  - 2006/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 2106
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2106
        AB  - Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group size or public signals. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity in teams.
        KW  - punishment
KW  - team production
KW  - public good
KW  - monitoring
KW  - experiment
        ER  -