TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Gautier, Pieter A.
AU  - Wolthoff, Ronald P.
        TI  - Simultaneous Search with Heterogeneous Firms and Ex Post Competition
        PY  - 2006/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 2056
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2056
        AB  - We study a search model where workers can send multiple applications to high and low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that there is a unique equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and both to the low productivity sector. Efficiency requires however that they apply to both sectors because then the coordination frictions are lowest. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes are the same under directed and random search. Allowing for free entry creates a second source of inefficiency.
        KW  - efficiency
KW  - coordination frictions
KW  - directed search
        ER  -