@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp2043,
            	author={Kaas, Leo and Madden, Paul},
            	title={Holdup in Oligopsonistic Labour Markets: A New Role for the Minimum Wage},
            	year={2006},
	month={Mar},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={2043},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp2043},
	abstract={We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first–best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.},
	keywords={minimum wage;investment;holdup},
            }