TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Miettinen, Topi
AU  - Poutvaara, Panu
        TI  - Political Parties and Network Formation
        PY  - 2006/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 1918
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1918
        AB  - We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.
        KW  - political parties
KW  - two-sided platforms
KW  - rent-seeking
KW  - network formation
        ER  -