%0 Report
        %A Miettinen, Topi
%A Poutvaara, Panu
        %T Political Parties and Network Formation
        %D 2006
        %8 2006 Jan
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 1918
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1918
        %X We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.
        %K political parties
%K two-sided platforms
%K rent-seeking
%K network formation