@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp1918,
            	author={Miettinen, Topi and Poutvaara, Panu},
            	title={Political Parties and Network Formation},
            	year={2006},
	month={Jan},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={1918},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1918},
	abstract={We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.},
	keywords={political parties;two-sided platforms;rent-seeking;network formation},
            }