%0 Report %A Gáspár, Attila %A Gyöngyössi, Győző %A Reizer, Balázs %T Decentralized but Dependent: Clientelism through Workfare %D 2026 %8 2026 Nov %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) %C Bonn %7 IZA Discussion Paper %N 19094 %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp19094 %X This paper studies how discretionary intergovernmental transfers can sustain political dependence in decentralized systems. We develop a probabilistic voting model of two-layered clientelism in which the central government allocates workfare across municipalities while choosing whether programs are administered locally by mayors or centrally by state agencies. When mayors control access to jobs, the center can condition future allocations on local electoral performance, turning mayors into vote brokers. Using municipality-level administrative data on Hungary's workfare program and a difference-in-differences design, we show that higher workfare intensity increased support for both the national incumbent party and local mayors—but only when programs were administered by mayors rather than by state-owned enterprises. Municipalities that delivered weaker support in national elections subsequently received fewer positions in mayor-managed programs, and the electoral returns to workfare are larger where mayoral races are more competitive. Together, these findings show how discretionary local control and politically contingent funding can transform decentralization from a mechanism of accountability into one of vertical clientelism. %K workfare program %K clientelism %K decentralization