%0 Report
        %A Kowalik, Zuzanna
%A Lewandowski, Piotr
%A Pompei, Fabrizio
%A Stichnoth, Holger
%A Szymczak, Wojciech
%A Thil, Laurène
        %T Entry Motivations Shape Preferences for Social Protection Among Platform Workers
        %D 2026
        %8 2026 Oct
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 18967
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18967
        %X We study platform workers' preferences for social protection — in the form of sick pay and paid annual leave — distinguishing between workers who entered platform work out of economic necessity (the "pushed") and those attracted by its flexibility and advantages (the "pulled"). Using a discrete-choice experiment administered to nearly 800 taxi, delivery, and cleaning platform workers in Germany, Italy, and Poland, we find an average willingness to pay at 3.7% of earnings for sick pay coverage and 4.6% for paid annual leave. Preferences, however, differ sharply by motivation: pushed workers are willing to forgo on average 5.3% of earnings for sick pay, and 5.6% for paid annual leave, while pulled workers' valuations are substantially lower (3.1% and 4.2%, respectively). This difference is most pronounced among workers without access to these benefits, suggesting that the absence of protections is particularly consequential for those who entered platform work under greater economic constraint. The findings indicate that the welfare impact of extending social protections to platform workers — as proposed by the EU Platform Work Directive — might depend on the share of necessity-driven workers in the platform workforce.
        %K platform work
%K willingness to pay
%K discrete choice experiment
%K social protection
%K job quality