@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18778,
            	author={Ziegler, Lennart},
            	title={Labor Market Tightness and Hiring Outcomes: Evidence from Job Application Data},
            	year={2026},
	month={Jul},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18778},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18778},
	abstract={This study examines how the supply of job applicants shapes hiring outcomes of firms. Using Austrian matched vacancy-worker data, my analysis exploits variation in the number of job applications, inferred from referrals made by the public employment service. To address endogeneity concerns, I instrument the number of applications with the inflow of jobseekers from mass layoffs. A larger supply of applicants shortens vacancy filling duration and raises the job tenure of hires, consistent with improved worker-firm match quality. At the same time, more applications lower starting wages, which indicates that the employer-bargaining channel dominates the match-quality channel. A larger applicant pool also reinforces worker segregation: firms with high shares of male (native) workers hire even fewer female (foreign) workers when applications are abundant. This reflects employer selection rather than a shift in the composition of the applicant pool, which responds little to the supply shock.},
	keywords={labor market tightness;vacancies;recruitment;worker-firm match quality;wage setting;worker segregation},
            }