%0 Report
        %A Haller, Andreas
%A Staubli, Stefan
        %T Measuring the Value of Disability Insurance from Take-Up Decisions
        %D 2026
        %8 2026 Jul
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 18769
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18769
        %X The central trade-off for designing Disability Insurance (DI) is between providing insurance to those in need while maintaining incentives to work. This paper develops a novel revealed-preference approach to identify the insurance value of DI benefits. We show that comparing the DI take-up response to a change in benefits versus a change in wages identifies the insurance value. Implementing our framework in Canada, we estimate that increasing DI benefits by $1 creates an additional disincentive cost of $0.60 but creates an insurance value of $2.20. Thus, our approach suggests that DI benefits are not overly generous in the Canadian context.
        %K disability insurance
%K take-up
%K benefits
%K policy reform