@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18769,
            	author={Haller, Andreas and Staubli, Stefan},
            	title={Measuring the Value of Disability Insurance from Take-Up Decisions},
            	year={2026},
	month={Jul},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18769},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18769},
	abstract={The central trade-off for designing Disability Insurance (DI) is between providing insurance to those in need while maintaining incentives to work. This paper develops a novel revealed-preference approach to identify the insurance value of DI benefits. We show that comparing the DI take-up response to a change in benefits versus a change in wages identifies the insurance value. Implementing our framework in Canada, we estimate that increasing DI benefits by $1 creates an additional disincentive cost of $0.60 but creates an insurance value of $2.20. Thus, our approach suggests that DI benefits are not overly generous in the Canadian context.},
	keywords={disability insurance;take-up;benefits;policy reform},
            }