@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18644,
            	author={Judy, Andrew and Kesternich, Iris and Mathevet, Isadora and Zimpelmann, Christian Pugnaghi},
            	title={Sorting in Marriage Markets: The Role of Non-Wage Amenities},
            	year={2026},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18644},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18644},
	abstract={Partners often match on similar characteristics, such as demographics and wages, contributing to inequality between households. We study whether non-wage job amenities—an important part of compensation in the labor market that may also affect household production—play a role in marriage sorting. Using linked survey and administrative data from Germany, we infer individuals’ expected future job attributes from their jobs at the time of matching and estimate a frictionless transferable-utility model. We find positive assortative matching on lifetime earnings, part-time work potential, and schedule regularity, suggesting complementarities within households. In contrast, we find no evidence of sorting on work meaning. Counterfactual simulations show that while assortative matching increases inequality overall, sorting on non-wage amenities slightly reduces it, lowering the Gini coefficient of total compensation by 3.3 percent.},
	keywords={marriage market;assortative matching;non-wage amenities;household inequality},
            }