%0 Report
        %A Mattozzi, Andrea
%A Nocito, Samuel
%A Sobbrio, Francesco
        %T Fact-Checking Politicians
        %D 2026
        %8 2026 Apr
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 18534
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18534
        %X We study how politicians respond to the fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design employs a difference-in-differences approach, complemented by a randomized field intervention conducted in collaboration with a leading fact-checking organization. We find that fact-checking discourages politicians from making factually incorrect statements, with effects lasting several weeks. At the same time, we show that fact-checking neither increases nor displaces correct statements. Politicians who are fact-checked tend to substitute incorrect statements with either no statements or unverifiable ones, suggesting that they may also respond by increasing the “ambiguity” of their language to avoid public scrutiny.
        %K fact-checking
%K politicians
%K accountability
%K verifiability