TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bartelsman, Eric
AU  - Dobbelaere, Sabien
AU  - Mattioli, Alessandro Zona
        TI  - Intangible Assets and Imperfections in Product and Labor Markets
        PY  - 2026/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 18440
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18440
        AB  - This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing.  Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.
        KW  - price-cost markups
KW  - wage markups
KW  - rent sharing
KW  - intangibles
KW  - non-compete agreements
        ER  -