%0 Report
        %A Bartelsman, Eric
%A Dobbelaere, Sabien
%A Mattioli, Alessandro Zona
        %T Intangible Assets and Imperfections in Product and Labor Markets
        %D 2026
        %8 2026 Mar
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 18440
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18440
        %X This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing.  Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.
        %K price-cost markups
%K wage markups
%K rent sharing
%K intangibles
%K non-compete agreements