@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18440,
            	author={Bartelsman, Eric and Dobbelaere, Sabien and Mattioli, Alessandro Zona},
            	title={Intangible Assets and Imperfections in Product and Labor Markets},
            	year={2026},
	month={Mar},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18440},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18440},
	abstract={This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing.  Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.},
	keywords={price-cost markups;wage markups;rent sharing;intangibles;non-compete agreements},
            }