TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Balgova, Maria
AU  - Tekleselassie, Tsegay
AU  - Hensel, Lukas
AU  - Witte, Marc J.
        TI  - Wage Information and Applicant Selection
        PY  - 2025/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 18220
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18220
        AB  - Wage information is rare in job adverts, yet crucial for search. To study this information friction, we run a field experiment with real vacancies, randomly adding or withholding wage information. Disclosing wages does not change average application volumes. Instead, it amplifies the wage elasticity of applications: higher-wage vacancies receive more applicants, while lower-wage vacancies receive fewer. Average applicant quality remains unchanged, challenging standard directed search models. We rationalize the lack of skill-based sorting with two-sided limited information about applicants’ skills. We further show that firms’ decision not to post wages can act as insurance against unproductive matches.
        KW  - vacancy posting
KW  - wage posting
KW  - information
KW  - field experiment
KW  - job search
        ER  -