%0 Report
        %A Balgova, Maria
%A Tekleselassie, Tsegay
%A Hensel, Lukas
%A Witte, Marc J.
        %T Wage Information and Applicant Selection
        %D 2025
        %8 2025 Oct
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 18220
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18220
        %X Wage information is rare in job adverts, yet crucial for search. To study this information friction, we run a field experiment with real vacancies, randomly adding or withholding wage information. Disclosing wages does not change average application volumes. Instead, it amplifies the wage elasticity of applications: higher-wage vacancies receive more applicants, while lower-wage vacancies receive fewer. Average applicant quality remains unchanged, challenging standard directed search models. We rationalize the lack of skill-based sorting with two-sided limited information about applicants’ skills. We further show that firms’ decision not to post wages can act as insurance against unproductive matches.
        %K vacancy posting
%K wage posting
%K information
%K field experiment
%K job search