@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18220,
            	author={Balgova, Maria and Tekleselassie, Tsegay and Hensel, Lukas and Witte, Marc J.},
            	title={Wage Information and Applicant Selection},
            	year={2025},
	month={Oct},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18220},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp18220},
	abstract={Wage information is rare in job adverts, yet crucial for search. To study this information friction, we run a field experiment with real vacancies, randomly adding or withholding wage information. Disclosing wages does not change average application volumes. Instead, it amplifies the wage elasticity of applications: higher-wage vacancies receive more applicants, while lower-wage vacancies receive fewer. Average applicant quality remains unchanged, challenging standard directed search models. We rationalize the lack of skill-based sorting with two-sided limited information about applicants’ skills. We further show that firms’ decision not to post wages can act as insurance against unproductive matches.},
	keywords={vacancy posting;wage posting;information;field experiment;job search},
            }