@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp17823,
            	author={Jiang, Shuguang and Villeval, Marie Claire and Zhang, Zhengping and Zheng, Jie},
            	title={War and Peace: How Economic Prospects Drive Conflictuality},
            	year={2025},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={17823},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp17823},
	abstract={We experimentally study how economic prospects and power shifts affect the risk of conflict through a dynamic power rivalry game. Players decide whether to maintain the status quo or challenge a rival under declining, constant, or growing economic prospects. We find that conflict rates are highest when economic prospects decline and lowest when they improve. A behavioral model incorporating psychological costs and reciprocity can explain these differences. A survey on U.S.-China relations supports the real-world relevance of these findings. Inspired by the Thucydides’s Trap, this study highlights how economic expectations shape conflict dynamics, offering key insights into geopolitical stability.},
	keywords={Thucydides’s Trap;economic prospects;conflict;power shift;experiment},
            }